I agree, but I want to go even further: Local factionsshould only confederate into national or even area and regional factions under certain conditions and circumstances conducive to trans-regional integration.
我同意，但我想更进一步：地方派系只能在某些有利于跨区域一体化的条件和情况下联合成全国甚至地区和区域派系。
I suppose it would be better to illustrate this with an example. A paper by Johnson (2015) that areas in France which were a part of the Cinq Grosses Fermes - An internal French free-trade zone introduced by Colbert in 1664, which also serves as a meaningful proxy for where the integrative of the ancien regime's fiscal and legal capacity was at its strongest - People had more identification with what may be termed 'national interest' based on 'Cahiers de Doléance' which were a collection of local grievances sent to the estates general on the eve of the French revolution.
我想用一个例子来说明这一点会更好。 Johnson (2015) 的一则论文指出，法国的一些地区是 Cinq Grosses Fermes 的一部分——科尔伯特于 1664 年引入的法国内部自由贸易区，它也可以作为旧政权财政一体化的有意义的代表。法律能力也处于最强状态——人们对基于《Cahiers de Doléance》的所谓“国家利益”有了更多的认同，《Cahiers de Doléance》是法国大革命前夕发送给各阶层的当地不满情绪的集合。
In the more firmly integrated areas, the Cahiers were more likely to mention things like 'King' or 'France' or ask for more uniform weights and measures, the abolition of estate privileges, and equal rights before the law. Etc.
在一体化程度较高的地区，《手册》更有可能提及“国王”或“法国”等字眼，或者要求更统一的度量衡、废除庄园特权以及法律面前的平等权利。
By contrast, in the less integrated regions, the estates were concerned more with local affairs or the maintenance of regional privileges and peculiarities - Not to mention the interests of regions like Alsace, which actually opposed integrative institutions because they relied on cross-border trade.
相比之下，在一体化程度较低的地区，各阶层更关心当地事务或维护地区特权和特色——更不用说像阿尔萨斯这样的地区的利益了，这些地区实际上反对一体化制度，因为它们依赖跨境贸易。
The mere existence of a strong state molded the political incentives and preferences of local estate elites that drew them into the politics of the centre.
强大国家的存在本身就塑造了当地地产精英的政治动机和偏好，将他们吸引到中央政治中。
There are a bunch of ways to explain this phenomenon. If you are reading this, you are probably thinking of some already. But I would like to draw your attention to the issue of knowledge also raised in Johnson's paper - Before the CGF and other absolutist centralizing reforms, merchants across the country may very well have shared ideas 'Man, wouldn't it be convenient if weights and measures were everywhere the same' but of course, due to the lack of interaction they may not even have realized that they shared the same interest.
有很多方法可以解释这种现象。如果您正在阅读本文，您可能已经想到了一些。但我想提请您注意Johnson 论文中也提出的知识问题 - 在 CGF 和其他专制集权改革之前，全国各地的商人很可能已经分享了想法“伙计，如果重量和各地的措施都是一样的”，但当然，由于缺乏互动，他们甚至可能没有意识到他们有共同的兴趣。
Even if they knew they might disagree about which weights and measures to adopt, they might not even trust each other that much, and 'why is the monarchy's tax system legitimate anyway?' .
即使他们知道他们可能会在采用哪种度量衡方面存在分歧，他们甚至可能不会那么信任彼此，“为什么君主制的税收制度无论如何都是合法的？” 。
So it was rational to focus on securing the powers and privileges of the local guild or other such institutions.
因此，集中精力确保当地行会或其他此类机构的权力和特权是合理的。
But increasing centralization brought them under a common framework and may have facilitated the formation of something like a shared merchant identity (The implications for the history of so-called 'nationalism' are obvious, and not required to be spelled out here.
但日益集中化使它们处于一个共同的框架下，并可能促进了诸如共享商人身份之类的东西的形成（对所谓“mz主义”历史的影响是显而易见的，不需要在这里详细说明。
I will also point out that the very institution of the estates may have already pushed things in this direction back in the 11th century).
我还要指出，早在 11 世纪，精英制度就可能已经将事情推向了这个方向。

National Identity in the 1789 General Cahiers. Darker color represents greater identification in the Cahiers by the Nobility and Third Estate with either the ‘King’ or ‘France’ according to Hyslop (1934).
1789 年《通用手册》中的国家认同。根据希斯洛普（Hyslop，1934）的说法，较深的颜色代表贵族和第三阶层在《手册》中对“国王”或“法国”的更多认同。
Each grid point in map assigned a value based on the inverse-weighted distance of surrounding 12 cities that sent in Cahiers (exponent of distance used is the default of 2). The Cinq Grosses Fermes region is delineated in red and treated as a barrier. (Taken from Johnson 2015)
地图中的每个网格点根据手册中发送的周围 12 个城市的反加权距离分配一个值（使用的距离指数默认为 2）。 Cinq Grosses Fermes 区域用红色划定，并被视为屏障。 （摘自Johnson 2015 年）

A few users raised related issues in a recent thread about India:
一些用户在最近关于印度的帖子中提出了相关问题：
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the crux of the matter was that a highly armed peasantry, combined with a semi-feudal system of landowners meant that India was highly decentralized and rebellious, yet still had large armies compared to European polities.
问题的关键在于，高度武装的牢农，加上半封建的地主制度，意味着印度高度分散和叛逆，但与欧洲政体相比，仍然拥有庞大的军队。
Furthermore, the Mughal Empire, attempting to create a centralized imperial state, engaged in various methods to quell this sort of thing
而且，莫卧儿帝国试图建立一个中央集权的帝国国家，采取了各种方法来平息这种事情。
. . .
In the end, it would take the British to completely demilitarize the Indian population, and they would not manage that until 1858, after the Rebellion in 1857 - so well out of the EU period.
最终，英国需要让印地&乌尔都佬完全非军事化，而他们直到 1858 年、即 1857 年叛乱之后才做到这一点——这远远超出了欧盟时期。
“”For our purposes, the South Asian population, at least in the North, was heavily armed, heavily belligerent, and heavily ungovernable.
就我们的目的而言，南亚人民，至少在北方，是全副武装、极度好战、极度难以治理的。“”
Kolff summarizes the implications for state thus:
科尔夫总结了对国家的影响：
Unlike the European model of state-formation, with a top-down pressure due to a monopoly on violence, in India that "essence of the state" was Personenverbandstaat: the state as an association of individual persons and built upon those relationships, fundamentally connected to the central person of the emperor.
与欧洲的国家形成模式不同，由于对暴力的垄断而受到自上而下的压力，而在印度，“国家的本质”是Personenverbandstaat：国家作为个人的联合体并建立在这些关系之上，从根本上相互联系到皇帝的核心人物。
. . .
Makes sense. This is basically what I was thinking as well. In a lot of ways the Indian way of "making war," so to speak, was primarily interested in extracting tribute from locally-placed administrators (hereditary or otherwise), and not direct annexation or integration.
说得通。这基本上也是我的想法。可以说，在很多方面，印度“发动战争”的方式主要是想从当地的管理者（世袭或其他方式）那里获取贡品，而不是直接吞并或整合。
It's why the state was so tied to the personage of the Emperor - revolving around a system of gifts, honors and information that forced what Kolff calls "Indian alliance politics" to be tied tightly with the Gurkani throne.
这就是为什么国家与皇帝的人物如此紧密地联系在一起——围绕着一个礼物、荣誉和信息体系，迫使科尔夫所说的“印度联盟政治”与古尔卡尼（莫卧儿）王位紧密相连。
. . .
Of course even the British had to contend with this sort of thing - the zamindari system was still well and alive until 1947, and arguably it is still in force in some places today.
当然，即使是英国人也不得不应对这种事情 - 直到 1947 年，zamindari 制度仍然有效，并且可以说它今天在某些地方仍然有效。
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The proper implementation, given the history that I read of the region, would've required effectively making every single province in India its own tag. Effectively no state, even in the 14th century, ever conquered a territory.
考虑到我读到的该地区的历史，正确的实施需要有效地为印度的每个省份建立自己的标签。实际上，即使在 14 世纪，也没有哪个国家曾经征服过领土。
Any sort of expansion would just leave actual control to local administration, which would oftentimes pursue their own agendas (even waging war against other states). This system was recursive.
任何形式的扩张只会将实际控制权留给地方政府，而地方政府往往会追求自己的议程（甚至对其他国家发动战争）。这个系统是递归的。
It wasn't just that there was a ton of militarization at the local level, but that the entire system of rule was just layers upon layers of administrative deferment that could wind up independent on a whim.
不仅地方层面存在大量军事化，而且整个统治体系只是层层行政延期，最终可能会因一时兴起而独立。
You can see why from the various systems that you discuss in your post: this sort of "bottom-up" rather than "top-down" political system just didn't play well with EU4's expectation of a top-level "state", potentially with subjects beneath.
你可以从你在帖子中讨论的各种制度中看出原因：这种“自下而上”而不是“自上而下”的政治制度并不能很好地满足EU4对顶层“国家”的期望，可能有下面的主题。
You'd just have subjects under subjects under subjects, with all wars of conquest just leading to changing of subject ownership rather than any sort of conquest.
你只会在臣民之下有臣民，所有征服战争都只会导致臣民所有权的改变（什么CK2入侵cb），而不是任何形式的征服。
Even if it could be done, it'd be damn well near unplayable.
即使可以做到，也几乎无法玩（mt玩家表示吃地还涨贵批权势确实该图图了）。
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回复
India strikes me as an example of the opposite case. Local society (really, societies) that is weakly integrated on a trans-local level but also deeply locally entrenched. So you end up with a bewildering array of armed bands, zamindars, Jāti, and religious communities. Etc.
在我看来，印度是一个相反的例子。地方社会（实际上是社会）在跨地方层面上的整合程度较弱，但在地方层面上也根深蒂固。所以你最终会看到一群令人眼花缭乱的武装团体、扎明达尔、种姓和宗教团体等等。
dominating society on the local level, making it, as @Lindaegan says in his thread: "heavily ungovernable." Under these circumstances, it may seem strange that India has a history of large empires, several of which were ruled by elites from outside the continent. But this is not surprising at all.
在地方层面上主宰社会，正如@Lindaegan 在他的帖子中所说：“严重无法治理。”在这种情况下，印度拥有庞大帝国的历史，其中一些帝国是由来自非洲大陆以外的精英统治的，这似乎有些奇怪。但这一点也不奇怪。
Since each of these local power centres cannot stand against the full might of the central court on their own, it makes it highly feasible (indeed, recommended even) that a ruler play them off against each other through patronage politics.
由于这些地方权力中心中的每一个都无法单独对抗中央朝廷的全部力量，因此统治者通过庇护政治使它们相互对抗变得非常可行（实际上，甚至是推荐的）。
All this creates a paradoxical situation of a society that is relatively easy to conquer and rule on a large scale, but nearly impossible to govern or penetrate too deeply with the government apparatus, except on its own terms.
所有这一切都造成了一个矛盾的局面：一个社会相对容易大规模征服和统治，但几乎不可能被政府机构统治或渗透得太深，除非按照它自己的条件。
The Middle East is another instance of such a fragmented society, with localities dominated by princelings, tribal chiefs, sheiks, urban guilds, sufi brotherhoods, bishops, patriarchs, and other power centres.
中东是这种分裂社会的另一个例子，当地由土著亲王、部落首领、酋长、城市行会、苏菲派、主教、族长和其他权力中心主导。
Yet it also has a history of large imperial states because while these connect and intertwine in complex ways, they are still too highly fragmented to cause any coherent threat to the centre, which can play them off each other but cannot impose its will on them as a collective.
然而，它也有大型帝国国家的历史，因为虽然这些帝国国家以复杂的方式相互联系和交织，但它们仍然高度分散，无法对中心造成任何连贯的威胁，中心可以相互对抗，但不能将自己的意志强加于它们。一个集体。

Karen Barkey (1994) describes this condition for the Ottomans quite well:
Karen Barkey (1994) 很好地描述了奥斯曼人的这种情况：
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Although different state-society arrangements preserved social controlin diverse regions, a general principle of rule was applied throughout, which rendered even indirect rule more controlling than it would otherwise have been.
尽管不同的国家社会安排在不同的地区保留了社会控制，但普遍的统治原则始终适用，这使得即使是间接统治也比其他方式更具控制力。
State control was exerted through ties from the periphery to the center, segmenting elites and common people, all of whom were responsive to the center but not to each other. Relations with the center were strong, while those among groups and communities were weak; this weakness was maintained by such practices as rotation of regional offices. Sociopolitical and economic links of patronage and trade all extended from the periphery to the central state. Because links within the periphery were weak, social disorganization became the pattern in Ottoman provinces. Şerif Mardin, who has well demonstrated the lack of corporate entities in Ottoman society, describes such state-created diffuseness ashaving hindered the development of autonomous bodies. Accordingly, it is necessary not just to describe institutions and groups in society but also to explain the manner in which the state manipulated them and created diffuse and fluid identities.
国家控制是通过从外围到中心的联系来实施的，将精英和普通民众区分开来，他们都对中心负责，但彼此之间不负责。与中心的关系很强，而团体和社区之间的关系很弱；区域办事处轮换等做法维持了这一弱点。赞助和贸易的社会政治和经济联系都从外围国家延伸到中央国家。由于与外围地区的联系薄弱，社会瓦解成为奥斯曼各省的普遍现象。谢里夫·马尔丁（Şerif Mardin）很好地证明了奥斯曼社会缺乏法人实体，他将这种国家创造的分散性描述为阻碍了自治团体的发展。因此，不仅有必要描述社会中的机构和群体，而且有必要解释国家操纵它们并创造分散和流动的身份的方式。
. . .
A second factor disabling opposition was that the state, in response to the sociopolitical and financial demands of consolidation, created a provincial situation in which concerted, organized opposition was practically impossible. Even though the provincial actions of the state may not have been fully intentional or calculated, a regional policy can be pieced together. This regional policy played havoc with elites.
阻碍反对派的第二个因素是，为了满足巩固的社会政治和财政需求，国家创造了一种省级的局面，在这种情况下，协调一致、有组织的反对派实际上是不可能的。尽管国家的省级行动可能不是完全有意或经过计算的，但区域政策可以拼凑在一起。这种区域政策对精英造成了严重破坏。
. . .
In this chapter, I argue that the main consequence of this regional policy was the creation of multiple layers of winners and losers among the elites. Within each group of provincial officials, the state managed to divide in such a way as to set landholder against landholder, governor against governor, and governor-general against governor-general. In the general atmosphere of competition, elites were unable to organize for concerted action against the state.
在本章中，我认为这种区域政策的主要后果是在精英中产生了多层的赢家和输家。在每一组省级官员中，国家设法划分地主与地主、总督与总督、总督与总督。在普遍的竞争氛围中，精英们无法组织起来反对国家。
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China is probably the best example of this type of structure fully crystallized. China had an immensely wealthy and influential landowning gentry class, if they could somehow organize and pool their resources together, they would no doubt completely dominate the state.
赛里斯可能是这种结构完全结晶的最好例子。赛里斯有一个非常富有和有影响力的地主士绅阶级，如果他们能以某种方式组织和集中他们的资源，他们无疑将完全统治国家。
In Project Caesar's terms, they would easily have 90%+ power or more (possibly only counteracted by some other groups in Chinese local society that also did not organize above the local level), yet this did not happen, the gentry never posed such a coherent challenge to any Chinese dynasty - Except arguably the late Qing (see below).
用凯撒计划的话说，他们很容易拥有90%以上的权力或更多（可能只是被赛里斯本土社会中其他一些同样没有在地方层面之上组织起来的群体所抵消），但这并没有发生，士绅从来没有提出过这样的要求。对任何中国王朝的连贯挑战——可以说除了晚清（见下文）。
There's nothing like a Chinese gentry acting in an organized manner on the national scale.
没有什么比赛里斯士绅在全国范围内有组织地行动更好的了。
Some of this is perhaps due to China's immense size combined with lacking pre-modern infrastructure and communication technology, but neither did the great families in China organize on the provincial level in the way, for instance, French aristocrats would (This changes somewhat during the Qing period).
其中部分原因可能是由于中国幅员辽阔，加上缺乏前现代的基础设施和通讯技术，但赛里斯的大家族也没有像法国贵族那样在省级组织起来（这种情况在清朝时期）。
Compared to India and the Middle East, the Chinese state was more successful in establishing a durable patronage network that tied these elites to the state to play them against each other and ensure their loyalty.
与印度和中东相比，赛里斯政府更成功地建立了持久的庇护网络，将这些精英与国家联系起来，使他们相互竞争并确保他们的忠诚。
It did so in a systemic manner via the famous examination system in which scions of local elite families were recruited into the officialdom. There's little need to recount all the details of this system here.
它通过著名的科举制度以系统的方式做到了这一点，在这种制度下，地方精英家庭的后裔被招入官场。几乎没有必要在这里重述这个系统的所有细节。
But one way through which this worked was, for instance, by assigning prefectural quotas for successful candidates.
但实现这一目标的一种方法是，例如，为成功科举的候选人分配县级官职配额。
While the official reason - preventing certain wealthy and developed prefectures from completely dominating the government - no doubt played a role in establishing this policy, it is also a blatant way to distribute patronage, as shown by the fact that prefectural quotas may be increased on an ad-hoc basis, for instance when the emperor passed through a location or to areas with 'strategic priority.' (Chaffe 1995 p.53)
虽然官方的理由——防止某些富裕和发达的县完全控制政府——无疑在这一政策的制定中发挥了作用，但这也是一种明目张胆的分配恩惠的方式，从事实可以看出，县级官职的配额可能会增加临时基础，例如当皇帝经过某个地点或具有“战略优先权”的地区时。 （Chaffe 1995 年第 53 页)
Chinese history is also the basis for the best theoretical exploration of this idea by Yuhua Wang (2022). His thesis about elite social terrain has actually been previously mentioned on this forum by @Linbot#6018 citing one of his articles which summarise the argument:
赛里斯历史也是王玉华（2022）对这一思想进行最佳理论探索的基础。他关于精英社会领域的论文实际上之前已经在这个论坛上被@Linbot#6018 引用过，他的一篇文章总结了这一论点：
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My overarching argument is that whether the state is strong or weak (state strength) and how it is structured (state form) follow from the network structure that characterizes state-society relations.
我的首要论点是，国家的强弱（国家强度）以及国家的结构（国家形式）取决于表征国家与社会关系的网络结构。
Among various aspects of state-society relations, I emphasize elite social terrain: the ways in which central elites connect local social groups (and link to each other).
在国家与社会关系的各个方面中，我强调精英社会地形：中央精英连接地方社会群体（以及相互联系）的方式。
When elites are in geographically broad and densely interconnected networks, they prefer a strong state capable of protecting their far-flung interests, and their cohesiveness constrains the ruler’s power.
当精英们处于地域广阔、联系紧密的网络中时，他们更喜欢一个能够保护他们广泛利益的强大国家，他们的凝聚力会限制统治者的权力。
When elites rely on local bases of power and are not tightly connected, they will instead seek to hollow out the central state from within and prefer to provide order and public goods locally; their internal divisions will enable the ruler to play competing factions against each other and establish absolute power.
当精英依赖地方权力基础、联系不紧密时，他们反而会寻求从内部掏空中央国家，更愿意在地方提供秩序和公共物品；他们的内部分裂将使统治者能够相互竞争并建立绝对权力。

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His core thesis surrounds what he calls 'Elite social terrain' in which elites that have dense trans-regional connections with each other prefer a more powerful state that can safeguard their interests but can also organize to oppose and limit the ruler.
他的核心论点围绕着他所谓的“精英社会领域”，在这个领域中，彼此之间有着密集的跨地区联系的精英们更喜欢一个更强大的国家，这个国家既可以维护他们的利益，又可以组织起来反对和限制统治者。
Meanwhile, elites with weak cohesion will seek to limit state intrusion and build up their local power bases, but leave a more autocratic ruler in the centre.
与此同时，凝聚力较弱的精英将寻求限制国家入侵并建立地方权力基础，但在中心留下一个更加专制的统治者。

China from the Song onwards is probably closer to the ideal-type bowtie network, while Middle Eastern regimes were generally less successful at connecting a ring into a bowtie (until the Ottoman Empire, that is) and Indian empires in the north tended to fall apart before they fully achieved this.
从宋朝开始，赛里斯可能更接近理想型的领结网络，而中东政权通常不太成功地将圆环连接成领结（直到奥斯曼帝国），而印度帝国则倾向于分崩离析在他们完全实现这一点之前。
Contrary to certain stereotypes about the unchanging nature of the Chinese dynastic order, Chinese society and government changed quite a bit throughout the centuries.
与中国王朝秩序不变的某些刻板印象相反，中国社会和政府在几个世纪以来发生了很大的变化。
In the early days of the Tang dynasty, an exclusive marriage network of several dozen old aristocratic families dominated the state apparatus. The Tang state brought in huge revenues and could maintain strict control over landholding.
唐朝初期，由数十个旧世家组成的专属婚姻网络主导了国家机器。唐朝国家带来了巨额收入，并且可以对土地所有权保持严格的控制。
However, this aristocracy could also effectively limit the sovereign's authority and organize to depose emperors they did not like.
然而，这些贵族也可以有效地限制君主的权威，并组织废黜他们不喜欢的皇帝。
The Tang aristocracy also had a somewhat quasi-colonial relationship with the rest of the country, where aristocrats from the ruling families (residing mainly in the two capitals and the corridor between them) were parachuted to high offices to govern the rest of the empire - This possibly shows one of the weaknesses of such a system, where the national aristocracy grows isolated and detached from the country they are supposed to rule.
唐朝贵族与国家其他地区也有某种准殖民关系，来自统治家族的贵族（主要居住在两个首都及其之间的走廊）被空降到高级职位来统治帝国的其他地区 -这可能显示了这种制度的弱点之一，即民族贵族变得孤立并脱离了他们应该统治的国家。
As the Tang hold grew weaker, local elites grew more influential, and in the end, Tang governors were killed, overthrown, or expelled and replaced by regional strongmen (that is my reading of the situation anyway).
随着唐朝统治力的削弱，地方精英的影响力越来越大，最终，唐朝的统治者被杀、被推翻，或者被驱逐并被地方强人取代（无论如何，这是我对情况的解读）。
The Tang aristocracy grew too closely dependent on the dynasty itself, and when its capitals were sacked and the dynasty fell, they (or more importantly, their marriage network and its stranglehold on power) were destroyed.
唐朝贵族变得过于依赖王朝本身，当其首都被洗劫、王朝灭亡时，他们（或者更重要的是，他们的婚姻网络及其对权力的束缚）被摧毁了。
From the wreckage arose the Song dynasty which reorganized itself around a bowtie network and, though its historical roots go deeper, for the first time unveiled the examination system on the national stage, recruiting officials from regional gentry families instead of a national aristocracy.
宋朝在废墟中崛起，它围绕领结网络进行了重组，尽管其历史根源更为深厚，但它首次在国家舞台上公开了科举制度，从地方士绅家庭而不是国家贵族中选拔官员。
As a result, the emperor's (or whoever was controlling the emperor) power grew. Locally, however, there was a 'retreat of the state' where many state functions passed into the hands of local lineage groups. This tendency continued throughout the Ming period.
结果，皇帝（或控制皇帝的人）的权力增长了。然而，在当地，出现了“国家的撤退”，许多国家职能转移到了当地宗族团体的手中。这种倾向一直持续到整个明朝。
It also explains the apparent paradox that while Asian rulers were described as 'despots' by European observers, since they appeared to have much more personal power than any European ruler, even though in the end, Europe produced more intrusive state apparatuses.
它还解释了一个明显的悖论，即虽然亚洲统治者被欧洲观察家描述为“独裁者”，因为他们似乎比任何欧洲统治者拥有更多的个人权力，尽管最终欧洲产生了更具侵入性的国家机器。
This situation changed somewhat throughout the Qing period, as great families increasingly concentrated in urban areas, and something like a provincial elite came into being.
这种情况在清朝时期有所改变，名门望族越来越多地向城市集中，省级精英之类的东西也出现了。
This process was helped by the increasing decentralization of the Qing state, with more power devolved to the provincial level. In 1909, the dynasty introduced provincial assemblies quickly captured by those elites. The examination system was discontinued in 1905. In light of this, it is not surprising that this period also produced open endorsements of Feudalism from certain representatives of the Liberal gentry.
这一过程得益于清政府日益分权，更多的权力下放到省级。 1909年，王朝设立了省议会，很快就被这些精英占领了。科举制度于1905年终止。鉴于此，这一时期出现某些自由派士绅代表公开支持封建主义也就不足为奇了。
Polish magnates would be proud.
波兰富豪们一定会感到自豪。
The theoretical implications of this are easy to spot. In a fragmented society, state-building is very hard. How does an English ruler dead-set on introducing some new tax, law, or social regulation ensure it sticks? Well, that's easy: he calls the parliament!
其理论意义很容易看出。在一个支离破碎的社会中，国家建设非常困难。一位执意引入新税收、法律或社会法规的英国统治者如何确保其坚持下去？嗯，这很简单：议会！
Giving up immense authority, but, after haggling, bribing, and convincing the representatives, he has a reasonable expectation that if they do agree to his proposal, it is likely to be implemented. How does a Mughal ruler extract more taxation?
他放弃了巨大的权力，但在讨价还价、贿赂和说服代表之后，他有一个合理的期望：如果他们确实同意他的提议，那么该提议很可能会得到实施。莫卧儿统治者如何征收更多税收？
As per Lindaegan's thread cited earlier, it's a constant, neverending, thankless struggle that is as likely as not undone with the death of the ruler, and the next one has to keep running the treadmill.
正如前面引用的 Lindaegan 的帖子所说，这是一场持续不断、永无休止、吃力不讨好的斗争，很可能不会随着统治者的死亡而结束，而下一个统治者必须继续跑步。
But, for all the good it does for him, the Mughal emperor has more individual authority over his government than an English king.
但是，尽管这对他有好处，莫卧儿皇帝对他的政府比英国国王拥有更多的个人权力。
While he still has to look out for intrigues, factions, and usurpers, he is less likely to face a concerted social movement aimed at his overthrow, or radical restructuring of the government, such as King Charles I of England had to face.
虽然他仍然需要提防阴谋、派系和篡位者，但他不太可能面临一场旨在推翻他的协调一致的社会运动，或对政府进行彻底重组，就像英国国王查理一世所面临的那样。
This is why rulers throughout history often pass over the opportunity for state-building by establishing a star elite network in favor of a bowtie network.
这就是为什么历史上的统治者经常通过建立星形精英网络而放弃国家建设的机会，转而支持领结网络。
In China, the emperors from the Song onwards sought greater personal control by systematically shutting out elite involvement in the court, but as a result, power was redistributed out of the central government and into society.
在中国，从宋朝开始，皇帝通过系统地排除精英参与宫廷来寻求更大的个人控制，但结果是，权力从中央政府重新分配到社会。
We see this in France too - Despite all the apparent benefits the parliament provided in England, French rulers famously avoided calling the estates general for nearly 200 years before 1789, fearing what might happen if they did (as it turns out, these fears were not unfounded).
我们在法国也看到了这一点——尽管议会为英国提供了所有明显的好处，但众所周知，法国统治者在 1789 年之前的近 200 年里一直避免称呼三级会议，因为他们担心这样做会发生什么（事实证明，这些担心并没有发生）毫无根据）

This leads me to mention another element that should be represented in these societies, in certain circumstances almost any of these regional power centres could explode onto the map and become a state, @Ispil briefly alludes to this in the much-cited earlier thread about India: "It wasn't just that there was a ton of militarization at the local level, but that the entire system of rule was just layers upon layers of administrative deferment that could wind up independent on a whim."
这让我提到这些社会中应该体现的另一个要素，在某些情况下，几乎所有这些区域权力中心都可能在地图上爆炸并成为一个国家，@Ispil 在之前被广泛引用的有关印度的帖子中简要提到了这一点：“不仅地方层面存在大量军事化，而且整个统治体系只是层层行政延期，最终可能会因一时兴起而独立。”
In Iran, the Safavid empire arose out of a local, militarised messianic Shia religious order due to the pull of one charismatic individual and rapidly expanded and laid the foundation of the modern-day state of Iran.
在伊朗，萨法维帝国在一个有魅力的个人的推动下，从当地军事化的弥赛亚什叶派宗教秩序中崛起，并迅速扩张并为现代伊朗国家奠定了基础。
I hope I do not need to explain how this differs from 'the clergy estate' rebelling and establishing a theocracy. Such things do happen, for instance, the Teutonic order ruled Prussia as a transplanted elite of scions of impoverished South German families for its own benefit.
我希望我不需要解释这与“神职人员阶层”的叛乱和建立神权政治有何不同。这样的事情确实发生过，例如，条顿骑士团为了自身利益而将普鲁士统治为贫困的南德家庭后裔的移植精英。
This provoked opposition from the Prussian estates, composed of burghers from Baltic trading towns and landowning aristocrats who came mainly from North Germany (gasp), in the end, the estates revolted and established an oligarchical rule under the auspices of the king of Poland.
这引起了由波罗的海贸易城镇的市民和主要来自北德意志的地主贵族组成的普鲁士庄园的反对（喘息），最终，庄园起义，在波兰国王的支持下建立了寡头统治。
Meanwhile, in Egypt, the Mamluks, who were even more blatant case of foreign rule, did not face any such unified opposition from the Egyptian elite because they were socially fragmented and could be bought, coopted, or destroyed by the Mamluks on a case-by-case basis.
与此同时，在埃及，马穆鲁克人是外国统治的明目张胆的例子，他们并没有面临来自埃及精英的任何如此统一的反对，因为他们在社会上是分裂的，可以被马穆鲁克人收买、拉拢或摧毁——视具体情况而定。
To sum up my argument. I believe there should be a fundamental trade-off the player should have to make where you can allow local elites to organize and get involved in your central government, allowing for a stronger state, but diluting the power of the crown.
总结一下我的论点。我认为玩家应该做出一个基本的权衡，你可以允许地方精英组织并参与中央政府，允许一个更强大的国家，但稀释王室的权力。
Or you could suppress such an organization in favor of a powerful ruler but a weak state that has trouble penetrating local society, with many opportunities for mismanagement in either direction that could produce social and political upheaval or even revolution or heavily disrupt the operations of your government, or even result in state dissolution.
或者你可以镇压这样一个组织，转而支持一个强大的统治者，但一个弱小的国家难以渗透到当地社会，在任何一个方向上都有很多管理不善的机会，这可能会产生社会和政治动乱，甚至革命或严重扰乱你的政府的运作，甚至导致国家解体。
I am bad at naming, but we may call this 'Social mobilization' VS 'Social fragmentation,' which should exist alongside the current estate system.
我不擅长命名，但我们可以称之为“社会动员”VS“社会碎片化”，它应该与当前的等级制度并存。
A brief note on the sourcing. I resorted to citing some academic literature pertinent to the topic, which I frankly found fascinating, and I hope you will as well.
关于采购的简要说明。我引用了一些与该主题相关的学术文献，坦率地说，我觉得这些文献很有趣，我希望您也能这样做。
But the views presented here are my own syncretic ideas I came to after years of study and reading of various sources I could not fully list here even if I wanted to.
但这里提出的观点是我自己的综合想法，是我经过多年的研究和阅读各种资料后得出的，即使我想，我也无法在这里完全列出。

Sources: 资料来源：
Johnson, Noel D. (2015), Taxes, national identity, and nation building: Evidence from france. GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 15-33.
Johnson, Noel D. (2015)，税收、民族认同和国家建设：来自法国的证据。 GMU 经济学工作论文第 15-33 号。
Barkey, Karen. 1994. Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
巴基、凯伦. 1994.土匪与官僚：奥斯曼国家集权之路。纽约州伊萨卡：康奈尔大学出版社。
Chaffee, John W. 1995. The Thorny Gates of Learning in Sung China: A Social History of Examinations. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Chaffee, John W. 1995。宋代中国学习的荆棘之门：考试的社会史。纽约州奥尔巴尼：纽约州立大学出版社。
Wang, Yuhua. 2022. The Rise and Fall of Imperial China: The Social Origins of State Development (Vol. 13). Princeton University Press.
王玉华. 2022.中华帝国的兴衰：国家发展的社会起源（第13卷）。普林斯顿大学出版社。
Thanks for reading all that. I really appreciate it and am looking forward to hearing your thoughts on these matters.
感谢您阅读所有这些。我真的很感激，并期待听到您对这些问题的想法。

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好长